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Emergent Emergencies in Complex Ecosystems: 
Reflections on the Limits of Narrative Cognition and a 
Revisiting of Michael Crichton’s Jurassic Park (1990) 
_Abstract 
This article argues that ‘emergent emergencies’ in complex natural systems or ‘eco-
systems’ can be understood as the ethical consequences of cognitive failure or “epis-
temological error” (Gregory Bateson). More specifically, I hold that complex sys-
tems display emergent behaviors, and that narrative cognition — our human default 
way of making sense of the world — is not particularly well suited for understand-
ing emergence. Building on previous narratological work on the incompatibility of 
narrative and emergence (H. Porter Abbott, Richard Walsh), I argue further that nar-
rative thinking and complex systems are each characterized by distinct types of 
‘agency,’ or ways of conceptualizing agency. In its second half, the essay turns to 
Michael Crichton’s classic Jurassic Park (1990), reading the novel as a fictional 
thought experiment which not only simulates an emergency situation, but also ex-
plores the reasons for the collapsing of the control system in the fictional theme park 
from the vantage of chaos theory. It will be shown that the emergent emergency 
staged in the novel is the result of cognitive failure on the part of the park managers, 
who are misled by a ‘narrative of centralized control’ (Abbott) in their attempts to 
control the park and a reductionist conceptualization of ‘life.’ Such reductionist ap-
proaches to life are contrasted with ecological frameworks in this article. 
1_Introduction: ‘Emergent Emergencies’ as Ethical Consequences of Cognitive 
Failure 
The felicitous concept of ‘emergent emergencies,’ as proposed by the editors of this 
issue, suggests a close interrelationship between an ethical and a cognitive problem.1 
It implies that states of emergency can arise out of cognitive inability to comprehend 
‘emergence’ — a term used to describe the behavior of complex systems marked by 
“circular recursion” rather than straightforward linearity or mono-causality.2 Because 
of the massively “interdependent interactions” of their elements,3 such systems dis-
play “a complexity of form not predictable from antecedent conditions.”4 While it is 
certainly true that “[t]he systems of the world are […] numberless”5 and that emer-
gent behaviors can be observed in a whole range of natural and social systems,6 the 
specific phenomenon that this essay wants to look at more closely is that of the eco-
system. According to Stacy Alaimo, the notion of the ‘ecosystem’ can be regarded as 
the central concept in ecology because it paradigmatically captures the discipline’s 
interest in “systems of exchange, which includ[e] the cycles of nutrients, energy and 
chemicals.”7 But the concept also appeals to the interest of this issue in emergent 
emergencies as it inevitably raises the question of the human embeddedness in com-
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plex natural systems. This not only entails the ethical aspect of how human beings act 
in such systems, often seeking to acquire control or mastery over them. It also in-
cludes the cognitive ways in which humans make sense of — or misunderstand — the 
workings of ecosystems, and these attempts necessarily rely on forms of knowledge 
that are always culturally mediated.8 Emergent emergencies will therefore be under-
stood in the following as states of severity that have arisen from insufficient under-
standing of how complex systems operate.  
One might wish to describe the dynamics that produce emergent emergencies in 
ecosystems a little more precisely. To this end, I briefly turn to a particularly topical 
issue that has received increased attention in ecosystem ecology in the last 15 years: 
the debate on the Anthropocene. The notion of the ‘Anthropocene’ as such is far from 
uncontested,9 but the term is usually used to designate “the present, in many ways 
human-dominated, geological epoch,” as the chemist Paul Crutzen proposed in a Na-
ture article at the beginning of the new millennium.10 However, the idea of human 
domination of the Earth system is far from unproblematic, which is why the Anthro-
pocene is also often evoked to stress that humans have left their mark on Earth to 
such an extent that the effects of their agency have become noticeably recursive —
 for instance in the form of global warming. In her dissertation on Vital Reenchant-
ments: Biophilia, Gaia, Cosmos and the Affectively Ecological, Lauren Greyson 
therefore defines the Anthropocene as “the age of the human, in which we have ac-
quired unthinkable influence at precisely the time that we realize just how small the 
world is and how unpredictable the consequences of our own activities are.”11 What 
renders this background an interesting frame of reference for this essay is the tension 
between human cognition and action in the age of the Anthropocene. This tension is 
nicely illuminated by Greyson in the following way: 
[T]he Anthropocene is disenchantment come to pass; we are now as gods. How-
ever, in the Anthropocene we are also gods that are consistently outwitted by the 
very forces we are supposed to have mastered. This is because the Anthropocene 
offers us no vantage point from the heavens with which to view that which we 
bring upon ourselves; in the Anthropocene, the human has its fingers in every-
thing, but cannot possibly know the nature of all that it is affecting. The human 
is omnipresent, and very powerful indeed, but that power is always undermined 
and held in check by our embeddedness and inability to fully predict the dynam-
ics of complex systems.12 
The manner in which Greyson explains the logic of the Anthropocene — as a condi-
tion in which human beings “are consistently outwitted by the very forces [they] are 
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supposed to have mastered” — already indicates that emergent emergencies are nar-
ratively characterized by the structure of the turning point: Since such states of severi-
ty are fundamentally unpredictable in advance, the causes that have led up to them are 
usually only identifiable “with the benefit of hindsight” — a feature that Ansgar 
Nünning sees as typical of turning-point narratives.13 The interest of the present essay 
is thus in the dialectics of reversion that are at work when a narrative of presumed 
control over nature is suddenly ‘breached’14 and replaced by an emergent state of 
“out-of-controllness,” to adopt the term Nigel Clark uses in an essay on “panic ecolo-
gy.”15  
In order to shed more light on the emergence of ‘out-of-controllness’ in natural 
systems, I will later revisit Michael Crichton’s popular novel Jurassic Park (1990) as 
a classic literary fiction which presents an emergency situation in an ecosystem as the 
result of the fictional characters’ inability to comprehend emergence. The novel not 
only lends itself well to the overarching interest of this essay because of the inclusion 
of ideas from chaos theory — a scientific paradigm which has strongly contributed to 
the study of emergence in natural systems since the 1970s.16 It also presents genetic 
engineering as “the culmination of the modern drive to master the natural world.”17 In 
fact, the wish to control nature with the help of state-of-the-art technology is so om-
nipresent in Jurassic Park that Søren Brier posits the novel as a classic text engaging 
with the paradigm of ‘cybernetics’ in his article on the discipline for the Routledge 
Companion to Literature and Science. Understanding cybernetics as “a theory of con-
trol of the behavior of machines, organisms, and organizations by the way of feed-
back circuits,” Brier reads Jurassic Park as a text that “dramatize[s] the consequences 
of dispensing with cybernetic thinking in the effort to control complex non-linear 
systems by computers.”18 In staging the collapse of the park’s safety system, the nov-
el issues a “powerful renouncement of the deterministic control paradigm” and con-
trasts this fantasy with the paradigm of chaos theory: “nature is non-linear, fractal, 
and complex.”19 The interpretation of Crichton’s text advanced in this essay largely 
subscribes to this reading, but seeks to reframe the emergency situation in the park as 
the result of a conceptual failure in narrative imagining. This is because the park crea-
tors repeatedly fall back to the cognitive stance of what H. Porter Abbott (2008: 231) 
calls “the narrative of centralized control,” which prevents them from coming to 
terms with complexity and emergence. As a result, they also fail to take into account 
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the different agents in the emergence of life, which all impact the complex operations 
of the park’s ecosystem on different levels of biological organization.  
Before this argument can be developed in more detail, I will first clarify Abbott’s 
concept of the ‘narrative of centralized control’ in section 2 and explain why this 
cognitive stance is in severe danger of misrepresenting the kind of emergent behavior 
that complex natural systems display. For that matter, I will draw on the work of nar-
ratologists who have emphasized the general incompatibility of narrative cognition 
and emergence, and discuss some features of both narrative and complex systems that 
account for the tension between their distinct logics. The analysis of Crichton’s liter-
ary text in section 3 of this essay will then argue for the epistemic value of creative 
fictional narratives in mediating knowledge about emergence and complexity. While 
my reading of the novel is not entirely uncritical when it comes to aspects of form 
(especially with regard to its coherent ending), Jurassic Park will be presented as a 
‘thought experiment’ that employs some innovative literary means to simulate the 
emergent emergency constituted by the collapse of the park’s control system.20 As 
will be shown, these devices include the use of ‘metafictional metanarration’ as well 
as the multimodal integration of semiotic resources other than verbal language, which 
are used not least to invite critical reflection about the limits of narrative in represent-
ing emergent developments. Finally, in section 4, the understanding of ‘life’ as a fun-
damentally emergent phenomenon, which Crichton’s novel implies, will concisely be 
summarized. 
2_Resisting the ‘Narrative of Centralized Control’: On the Problem of Under-
standing Emergence 
The study of the nexus between narrative and emergence can itself be regarded as an 
emergent topic in the study of culture, as is documented by the groundbreaking essays 
by H. Porter Abbott and Richard Walsh.21 Narratology has acquired a central role in 
research on emergence because narrative is frequently looked at as the human default 
way of making sense of change in the world. Thus, it is commonly assumed that we 
possess “a genetic predisposition to grasp events in time through story form” (Abbott 
2008: 230) and that narrative is “our principal way of understanding our experience 
of reality by articulating patterns in time” (Walsh 2011: 84). However, what Abbott’s 
and Walsh’s work stresses is that human beings encounter considerable cognitive 
difficulties in comprehending emergence because humans display a “propensity for 
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narrative misrepresentation of complex phenomena” (ibid.: 75). This section therefore 
wants to explore some of the reasons for the restrictions of narrative cognition (also: 
‘narrative thinking’) in understanding complex living systems and the emergent be-
haviors these systems bring forth. To this end, I will argue that narrative sense-
making and complex systems are characterized by distinct kinds of agency (or ways 
of conceptualizing agency).  
My basic understanding of narrative, to begin with, follows David Herman’s “in-
tentionalist approach to narrative understanding,” as put forward in his recent study 
on Storytelling and the Sciences of Mind.22 According to Herman, narrative is a cog-
nitive tool that facilitates “reasoning about one’s own and others’ reasons for acting” 
and is therefore particularly suitable for conceptualizing intentional action.23 It is al-
ready in his earlier work on Story Logic that Herman calls upon narratologists to rec-
ognize “the interconnectedness of the very notions of narrative and action.”24 Ac-
cording to Herman, human attempts to make sense of actions are barely distinguisha-
ble from the construction of an explanatory narrative: “Action theorists themselves 
have compared analyzing actions with telling narratives about what agents have done. 
[…] Stories, in other words, rely implicitly on the same conceptual systems that ac-
tion theorists strive to make explicit through philosophical argumentation.”25 A posi-
tion repeatedly cited by Herman in this context is that of the philosopher Georg Hen-
rik von Wright: “To understand behavior as intentional […] is to fit it into a ‘story’ 
about an agent.”26 According to this view, it makes sense to distinguish the domain of 
‘action’ (and narrative) from the more general domain of ‘behavior’: actions are al-
ways goal-oriented and intentional — a feature that cannot be attributed to emergent 
behavior, as we shall presently see.27 A central feature of narrative that can be derived 
from this brief sketch, then, is that “human narratives […] almost inevitably begin to 
suggest teleologies, purposes, and ends,” as Patricia Waugh concisely puts it.28 This 
position is also consistent with the theories of ‘plot’ advanced by thinkers like Frank 
Kermode, Peter Brooks and Paul Ricœur, who have all suggested that narratives 
transform mere successions of events into a meaningful totality that is striving for an 
end-point.29  
The way in which narratives transform ‘mere behavior’ into ‘intentional action’ is 
incompatible with the kind of agency that complex systems display. The problem is 
not that there are no agents in such systems — quite the reverse: In fact, one can ar-
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gue that one major reason for our human difficulties in understanding the behavior of 
complex systems is “a massive distribution of cause among agents, […] each of 
which lacks any preeminent role in the emergent behavior of which it is a part” (Ab-
bott 2008: 233). In order to describe the phenomenon of emergence in complex living 
systems more accurately, it is generally helpful to differentiate between two distinct 
analytical levels: In such systems, emergent behavior arises on a superordinate level, 
whereas the interactions between the numerous agents mentioned above take place on 
a more basic level, i. e. the level of the system itself (cf. Walsh 2011: 77). The agents 
on the systemic micro-level can, but need not be, intentional beings; it generally suf-
fices to assume that they all follow fairly simple rules, which might even be genet-
ically prescribed. However, the complex behavior exhibited by the system on the 
higher (or ‘macro’) level is not simply describable as the sum of its parts. On the con-
trary, it “require[s] description at a level of organization above that which provides 
the base-level description of the system itself” (ibid.: 73). The micro-level, on the 
other hand, operates completely independently of the macro level (cf. Abbott 
2003: 147). While it plays an undeniable part in the production of emergent behavior 
on the macro-level, it is important to stress that the actors on the micro-level do not 
have the creation of such behavior as a goal. The phenomenon of emergence as such, 
the gradual realization or ‘coming into being’ of the complex behavior on the macro-
level, is located between the two levels. As the following diagram — loosely adapted 
from Abbott (2008: 235) — illustrates, complex systems can be thought of as “bot-
tom-up systems,” which “get their smarts from below.”30  
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Macro-level 
(emergent behavior) 
Emergence 
(the ‘coming into being’ of emergent behavior) 
Micro-level 
(interactions between a plurality of agents) 
Fig. 1: Emergence as bottom-up phenomenon  
Both Abbott and Walsh have convincingly argued in their works on narrative and 
complexity that both the micro- and the macro-level pose specific challenges to narra-
tive imagining, also rendering description a difficult task:31 The first problem with the 
macro-level of emergent behavior is that there actually is no agency driving the pro-
cess. Agents are located on the micro level of the system, not on the higher level 
brought forth by the system. Strictly speaking, then, the emergent behavior that we 
observe in the “game of Life” simulations discussed by Walsh (2011: 75) only per-
sists as a “pattern in time”; it is not guided by an intentional entity with a clear-cut, 
ontological status. Secondly, we encounter difficulties in describing the level of the 
system itself because of the “multiple simultaneous recursive operations” (ibid.) that 
take place on this level. While narrative thinking is well suited to understanding 
chains of successive actions and events, in this case all the actions that simultaneously 
unfold on the micro-level mutually impact one another and hence re-determine out-
comes in everlasting feedback loops. The special difficulty of understanding (or ‘nar-
rativizing’) emergence thus pertains to the fact that “emergent processes […] occupy 
a narrative blank between the micro and macro levels” (Abbott 2008: 235). Whereas 
the micro-level encompasses such a multitude of agents that keeping track of their 
simultaneous behaviors becomes a cognitive impossibility, the macro-level displays 
coordinated behavior but does not actually constitute any discrete agency in the strict 
sense of the term. 
Because of the incompatibility between narrative and complex systems as it has 
been outlined here, we may conclude that attempts to narrativize emergence run the 
risk of becoming “gross misrepresentation[s]” (Walsh 2011: 75) at the cost of a more 
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interactive and multi-layered picture of the phenomenon. Due to their specific way of 
conceptualizing agency, narrative accounts of complex processes tend to attribute 
intentionality to agents that, on closer inspection, resist this role (cf. ibid.). Abbott 
(2008: 231) has described our human temptation to narrativize complex behavior with 
his concept of “the narrative of centralized control,” defining the latter as “a distinct 
subclass of narrative” (ibid.) resting on the assumption “that collective behavior must 
be under the control of some guiding entity of an order distinct from the mass” 
(ibid.: 230). 
That such narratives are in danger of misrepresenting the ways in which natural 
systems actually operate has also been pointed out by scientists. In an article on “The 
Force of the Pacemaker Concept in Theories of Aggregation in Cellular Slime Mold,” 
Evelyn Fox Keller, a feminist philosopher of science and trained biologist, reflects on 
her research on the behavior of a slime mold, called Dictyostelium discoideum, which 
she conducted in the late 1960s together with her colleague Lee Segel.32 Dictyosteli-
um has acquired a considerable degree of popularity in the study of emergence, and it 
has even been suggested that it “may someday be seen as an equivalent of the finches 
and tortoises that Darwin observed on the Galápagos Islands.”33 The remarkable 
property of the slime mold is that it can act as either a single organism or as a swarm 
of “thousands of distinct single-celled units, each moving separately from its other 
comrades.”34 The cells, all of which are fairly simple on their own, display a stunning 
degree of intelligence when behaving as an organism. It is precisely such behavior 
that secures the survival of the slime mold under hostile environmental circumstanc-
es, allowing Dictyostelium to find solutions to concrete threats of starvation. As a 
‘complex adaptive system,’ the slime mold thus exhibits a kind of behavior that is 
emergent and self-organizing. 
The case of Dictyostelium is instructive here because Keller reports in her essay 
how she and Segel initially came up with an incorrect explanation to the question of 
what triggers the aggregation of the single cells. At first, the biologists assumed the 
existence of one special cell — a ‘founder’ or ‘pacemaker cell’ — which they held to 
be in charge of the coordination of the swarm as a whole. In spite of convincing evi-
dence against the concept, the pacemaker view was embraced with enthusiasm by the 
scientific community, as Keller recalls in her essay: “The assumption of pacemaker 
cells was felt to be so natural, it so readily explained the phenomena, that the question 
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I had begun with simply disappeared.”35 The pacemaker idea turned out to be an ex-
tremely resilient one in the scientific community, a “fait accompli,” but in fact it was 
altogether wrong. In particular, it failed to take into account the “more complex inter-
nal dynamics of the individual cells.”36 Keller therefore sends out a cautionary mes-
sage in the final paragraph of her text: 
More generally, I am suggesting that we might learn from the pacemaker story 
to be wary of imposing causal relations on all systems that seem by their very 
nature to be more complexly interactive. […] In our zealous desire for familiar 
models of explanation, we risk not noticing the discrepancies between our own 
predispositions and the range of possibilities inherent in natural phenomena. In 
short, we risk imposing on nature the very stories we like to hear.37 
With Abbott’s (2008) work on narrative and emergent behavior in mind, one might 
reframe Keller’s words as a warning against premature applications of the ‘narrative 
of centralized control’ in the explanation of natural systems. More recently, N. Kathe-
rine Hayles has articulated a message similarly cautionary in tone:  
The same faculty that makes us aware of ourselves as selves partially blinds us 
to the complexity of the biological, social, and technological systems in which 
we are embedded, tending to make us think we are the most important actors 
[…]. As we are discovering, from climate change to ocean acidification to 
greenhouse effects, this is far from the case.38  
Within the “faculty” that Hayles is talking about here — human consciousness —
 narrative thinking plays a pivotal role. However, as this section has attempted to 
show, this way of making sense of the world is also restricted in grasping the com-
plexity inherent in natural systems, several of which Hayles alludes to.  
In concluding this section, it seems important to underline once again that narra-
tive thinking is conceived of in this essay as a fundamental interpretative strategy on 
the part of human observers. As such, it must be distinguished from the semiotic arti-
facts that we conventionally refer to as ‘novels,’ ‘short stories,’ ‘films,’ ‘graphic nov-
els,’ or simply as ‘fiction.’39 The crucial epistemic value fiction can adopt is that it 
can function “as the exercise of our narrative understanding, as distinct from its appli-
cation,” as Walsh has submitted in his study on The Rhetoric of Fictionality.40 By 
conceptualizing it as a form of cognitive ‘exercise,’ Walsh argues that fiction is able 
to “extend the scope of our narrative understanding, not least by appealing to quite 
different ways of making sense” than are suggested by the causal and intentionalist 
logic of narrative action.41 I fully agree with this assertion but would like to add that 
one central reason why fictions are able to engage with the faculty of narrative think-
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ing self-reflexively is that they are themselves never ‘thoroughly narrative.’42 Instead, 
literature usually incorporates a wide range of symbolic forms that may invite mental 
operations other than narrative cognition. It is the task of interpretation, then, to shed 
light on the highly versatile ways in which literary fictions configure their elements 
into (more or less linear) plots, thus either encouraging narrative thinking or fore-
grounding its restrictions. What one is concerned with, in any case, is the analytical 
level that structuralist narratologists like Genette, Chatman and others have called the 
‘discourse’ of a given fictional artifact. The epistemic potential of literary fictions in 
advancing understanding of emergence and complexity will come under scrutiny in 
the following section, in which I turn to Michael Crichton’s Jurassic Park. The text 
makes for an interesting discussion in the present context as it displays strong interest 
in the restrictions human beings face in understanding emergent behaviors in complex 
natural systems — even if we will see that the critique of narrative cognition issued in 
the novel is somewhat compromised as a result of its own form. 
3_“Linearity is an artificial way of viewing the world”: Revisiting Michael 
Crichton’s Jurassic Park (1990) 
Since the fiction of Jurassic Park is a highly popular one (not least because of its ad-
aptation into a Hollywood blockbuster movie by Steven Spielberg in 1993), a brief 
introduction of the novel’s plot should suffice to provide the necessary context for the 
following argument. The story is set in an ecosystem that the ‘International Genetic 
Technologies (InGen)’ corporation has established under the guidance of CEO John 
Hammond in the form of a theme park on an island off the coast of Costa Rica. The 
so-called ‘Jurassic Park’ is spectacular, as it features real dinosaurs rather than anima-
tronics. To recreate the extinct animals, InGen’s scientists have extracted paleo-DNA 
from the blood of insects fossilized in amber. The genetic information is restored with 
the help of computerized sequencers; gaps in the genetic code are closed by using 
supplementary amphibian, reptilian or avian DNA. Apart from the complex computer 
system and the electrified fences, it is also part of Jurassic Park’s safety system that 
all dinosaurs are created as sterile females so that the geneticists are (supposedly, as it 
turns out) the only agents who can control the animals’ reproduction. After some dis-
concerting events, Hammond must put his Japanese investors at ease in order to open 
Jurassic Park on schedule. The team of scientific experts that is to review the park 
includes the mathematician Ian Malcolm. Based on his knowledge of chaos theory, 
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Malcolm warns that the park’s safety system will collapse unpredictably — not in 
spite of but because of its complex design, which not only includes “the dinosaurs in 
their complex ecosystem” but also “the humans with their individual investments.”43 
Malcolm, whose intellectual role in Crichton’s original novel is much more pro-
nounced than in Spielberg’s film, is proven right: Jurassic Park’s safety system in-
creasingly reveals itself as flawed on many levels, which jeopardizes the lives of the 
human characters on the island. In particular, it turns out that the dinosaurs have be-
gun to breed — in spite of their genetically controlled design. After the total human 
loss of control over Jurassic Park, the events on the island go fully awry and several 
people die in the process. While the few lucky survivors who have managed to con-
tact the mainland are waiting for a ship, Hammond is finally punished for his hubris: 
Having fallen down a hill, he is attacked and eaten by a pack of Procompsognathids 
or ‘compies,’ the small dinosaurs that were the first to reproduce in Jurassic Park.  
This short plot summary could almost fully suffice to point at the issue some 
commentators on the Jurassic Park fictions have taken with Crichton’s novel and, 
even more pointedly, with Spielberg’s film: For a text that is fundamentally con-
cerned not only with emergence but also with the restrictions of narrative thinking, 
the overall form of Crichton’s sci-fi techno-thriller, and especially the development of 
its plot in the second half, is surprisingly linear. The novel’s ending, in particular, is 
in danger of re-inscribing a teleological trajectory of poetic justice into its plot struc-
ture, which does not sit too well with the awareness of emergent developments in 
complex systems that the text otherwise seeks to advance. The late evolutionary biol-
ogist Stephen Jay Gould, who liked Crichton’s book, was among the first reviewers to 
give voice to this “theoretically fatal inconsistency” in its message:44 Apart from the 
punishment the morally flawed characters suffer for their actions, the fact that all of 
the likeable protagonists happily prevail against all odds is surprising given that “not 
a human soul in the park should have stood a chance of proceeding harmless through 
such a sequence.”45 Nevertheless, even if it shies away from executing the apocalyp-
tic vision it projects, the fictional text develops epistemic potential to the extent that it 
manages to invite meta-cognitive reflections about the limits of narrative cognition in 
comprehending emergence on the part of the reader. The concerns Jurassic Park ex-
presses with regard to ideologies of centralized control, which it frames as both a 
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cognitive and an ethical problem, are worth considering in the context of this essay’s 
more general interest in the ethical consequences of cognitive failure.  
Above all, it is Malcolm’s chaos theory that not only serves as a framework for 
theorizing emergence on the story level but also as a permanent critique of ‘linear’ 
thinking and control fantasies. Chaos theory has contributed to the study of emer-
gence because of its interest in self-organizing systems, in which states of disorder 
can spontaneously turn into structures of order and vice versa. As Hayles explains: 
“At the center of chaos theory is the discovery that hidden within the unpredictability 
of chaotic systems are deep structures of order. ‘Chaos,’ in this usage, denotes not 
true randomness but the orderly disorder characteristic of these systems.”46 In line 
with what was pointed out about emergence in section 2, chaotic systems do not rely 
on centralized agents to bring about spontaneous changes. On the contrary, it is the 
complex interaction between a multitude of agents that marks such systems as “rich 
in information,”47 but also as unpredictable and fundamentally recursive.48 The signif-
icance of non-linear recursion also manifests itself in the interest chaos theorists dis-
play in self-similar patterns — so-called ‘fractals’ — in nature. With the rise of chaos 
theory, as Ira Livingston explains, “[e]verything had become fractal — that is, pat-
terned at multiple scales — and self-similar, with patterns recurring at every scale, 
like a feather, each arm of which is shaped like a miniature feather in turn.”49  
Such fractals are also featured in Crichton’s novel, where they appear in the form 
of seven ‘iterations’ that are interspersed in the narrative discourse.50 The iterations 
reveal a fractal curve, drawn and commented upon by Malcolm, which serves to illus-
trate the principle of emergence. The fractal begins with an initial structure in the first 
iteration, in which “few clues to the underlying mathematical structure will be seen” 
(JP: 9), moving to the fourth iteration, in which “underlying instabilities begin to 
appear” (JP: 179), and then to the sixth iteration, at which stage “[s]ystem recovery 
may prove impossible” (JP: 315). The steady revealing of the ‘big picture’ underlines 
the shift from the seemingly random behavior of the curve on the micro-level to the 
stunning emergence of ordered patterns on the macro-level. By the seventh iteration, 
“the mathematics will demand the courage to face its implications.” (JP: 365) As a 
result of their strategic interspersal, the iterations document the loss of control over 
the park in a more abstract form and remind the reader again and again of the omni-
presence of recursive operations in complex systems. InGen’s efforts to regain power 
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over Jurassic Park are likewise turned into a repetitive principle, insofar as they are 
narrated in a series of chapters entitled “Control.” In narrative terms, then, Crichton 
juxtaposes InGen’s ‘control narrative’ with the emergent properties of complex eco-
systems, which follow their own rules. This second narrative — if it can be called 
such, given its lack of discrete agents — is latent in the text: Instead of being explicit-
ly told, the ‘narrative of emergence’ is only implied by the fractals as well as the 
mathematical graphs and diagrams in the novel, all of which contradict InGen’s con-
trol narrative by showing that the dinosaurs have long begun to breed.  
As Jurassic Park thus integrates semiotic resources other than verbal language, the 
text can be classified as a “multimodal novel” — a novel that “incorporates and rep-
resents a wide range of verbal and non-verbal signifying practices as well as narrative 
and non-narrative modes and ways of world-making.”51 One important function Hal-
let ascribes to this type of novel is the integration of non-verbal modes that can be 
utilized to “bear witness to the shortcomings of verbal language and narration.”52 Fol-
lowing up on my initial thesis about the incompatibility of narrative and emergence, 
one could argue that emergence is among the phenomena that “can hardly be con-
ceived of as, or translated into, verbal information.”53 It therefore calls for a mode of 
representation other than verbal language. This is the case with the seven iterations in 
Jurassic Park, which clearly privilege the mode of showing over telling and, in so 
doing, contribute to the production of ‘tacit knowledge’ about emergence on the part 
of the reader.54  
Multimodality is not the only device employed by the novel to represent emer-
gence, or to call attention to the restrictions of narrative and language in this endeav-
or. There are also several reflections about chaos theory, which are interspersed in 
various parts of the narrative in the form of dialogues between characters (cf. 
JP: 245–248, 283–285, 305–307, 311–314, 367–369). A particularly interesting case 
is the introduction to ‘chaotics’ Malcolm gives the paleontologist Grant (cf. JP: 170–
171). After a short explanation of the concept of fractals and their omnipresent place 
in nature, Malcolm sets out to strike a blow against the Western belief in linear pro-
gress, which marginalizes “sudden change as something that happens outside the 
normal order of things” (JP: 171). His reflection can be read as a critique of narrative 
thinking insofar as narrative is what facilitates linear reasoning: “[C]haos theory 
teaches us”, the mathematician goes on,  
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that straight linearity, which we have come to take for granted in everything 
from physics to fiction, simply does not exist. Linearity is an artificial way of 
viewing the world. Real life isn’t a series of interconnected events occurring one 
after another like beads strung on a necklace. Life is actually a series of encoun-
ters in which one event may change those that follow in a wholly unpredictable, 
even devastating way. […] That’s a deep truth about the structure of our uni-
verse. But, for some reason, we insist on behaving as if it were not true. 
(JP: 171)  
This passage is both ‘metanarrative’ and ‘metafictional’ in its effect: Its critical poten-
tial lies in the fact that it raises awareness of the limits of linear (narrative) reasoning 
in understanding life as the complex emergent phenomenon that it actually is.55 It 
becomes clear in the further course of the novel that Malcolm’s critique of linearity is 
leveled at two 500-year-old “Western attitudes” (JP: 312) in particular: the master 
narratives of scientific progress and control. As the chaos theorist puts it in a later 
passage: “Ever since Newton and Descartes, science has explicitly offered us the vi-
sion of total control. Science has claimed the power to eventually control everything, 
through its understanding of natural laws” (JP: 313). However, cracks in the manner 
in which modern science conceives of its own activities have become apparent after 
the logical problems raised by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and Godel’s theo-
rem (cf. JP: 313) at the beginning of the twentieth century, “[a]nd now chaos theory 
proves that unpredictability is built into our daily lives” (JP: 313). As a result, Mal-
colm concludes, “the grand vision of science, hundreds of years old — the dream of 
total control — has died, in our century” (JP: 313).  
Needless to say, Malcolm’s rants are directed, first and foremost, at InGen’s all too 
naive fantasy of being able to control the complex ecosystem they have erected on the 
Costa Rican island. One may certainly find that the novel is too polemic or Mani-
chaean in how it posits the ‘good’ paradigm of chaos theory against the ‘bad’ science 
of genetic engineering, which ultimately brings chaos theory paradoxically close to 
playing the role of a master narrative in its own right.56 However, as a fictional 
thought experiment, Jurassic Park is interesting because of the way in which it stages 
InGen’s loss of control over the park as an emergent emergency, dismantling the cor-
poration’s ‘narrative of centralized control.’ But what exactly is the narrative to 
which the InGen geneticists and Hammond fall victim?  
On the plot level, one of the major emergent emergencies is the discovery that the 
dinosaurs breed — despite the fact that they were genetically created as sterile fe-
males. Since this spontaneous development was unpredictable from the point of view 
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of the scientists, an explanation can only be given long after it has occurred. It is fi-
nally offered by the paleontologist Grant, who assumes that a “[g]ender transition” 
(JP: 375) must have enabled the animals to reproduce. To recapitulate, the Jurassic 
Park scientists used “supplemental DNA sequences of anachronistic species,”57 par-
ticularly avian, reptilian and amphibian DNA, to make complete strands out of the 
fragmentary DNA they had extracted from the dinosaur blood preserved in amber (cf. 
JP: 168, 210). Grant’s explanatory hypothesis, now, is that the gender switch must 
have occurred as a result of the use of the DNA of West African frogs:  
[A] number of plants and animals were known to have the ability to change their 
sex during life — orchids, some fish and shrimp, and now frogs. Frogs that had 
been observed to lay eggs were able to change, over a period of months, into 
complete males. They first adopted the fighting stance of males, they developed 
the mating whistle of males, they stimulated the hormones and grew the gonads 
of males, and eventually they successfully mated with females. (JP: 375) 
This explanation has intriguing implications for the conceptualization of life in the 
novel and reveals severe shortcomings in InGen’s agenda. Crichton’s fictional bioen-
gineers obviously subscribe to an understanding of life that Sarah Franklin has de-
scribed with the following formula: “nature becomes biology becomes genetics, 
through which life itself becomes reprogrammable information.”58 This definition of 
‘life as information,’ which emerged in the mid-twentieth century (not least in the 
context of early cybernetics), entails a significant transformation: The shift from ‘na-
ture’ to ‘reprogrammable information’ is also one “from observation to experimenta-
tion, that is, from representation to intervention to, most significantly, control.”59 And 
yet, in their attempt to control life, bioengineers are confronted with a dilemma, inso-
far as “genetic engineering works both with and against the telos of DNA,” as Steph-
anie Turner astutely remarks.60 This means that, while trying to modify genetic in-
formation, scientists paradoxically also rely on the chemical agency of DNA to build 
organisms — and this very agency, the fact that “the DNA molecule is self-authoring 
and therefore not completely accessible to the scientific gaze,” is obviously underes-
timated by InGen’s geneticists.61 To the extent that they reproduce or ‘copy’ their 
information, the genes of the Jurassic Park dinosaurs do appear ‘selfish,’ to use the 
metaphor from the title of Richard Dawkins’ popular scientific book The Selfish 
Gene — a highly gene-centric account of evolution by natural selection.62 The para-
digm that is re-invoked in Jurassic Park, then, is the view of “the DNA molecule as 
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autotelic, that is, as an entity working toward its own self-contained end.”63 The dino-
saurs’ genomes are, in this sense, among the non-human agents in Jurassic Park’s 
ecosystem that ‘outwit’ the human actors and thus bring about the very turning point 
typical of emergent emergencies by breaching InGen’s control narrative. 
However, we would not be dealing with an emergent phenomenon if a mono-
causal explanation of the emergency situation in the park, with the dinosaurs’ genes 
featuring as the only relevant agents, were to suffice.64 In fact, Grant’s above-cited 
hypothesis about the animals’ reproduction already suggests that superordinate levels 
of biological organization cannot simply be dispensed with. Hence, whereas it is safe 
to say that the frog DNA enables the “transsexual switch,”65 the agent that changes 
from ‘female’ to ‘male’ and subsequently begins to reproduce with other (female) 
dinosaurs in the park is the organism as a whole. The animals’ transitioning is a truly 
emergent behavior, as Grant further explains that “the change is stimulated by an en-
vironment in which all the animals are of the same sex. In that situation, some of the 
amphibians will spontaneously begin to change sex from female to male” (JP: 375). 
This explanation accounts for the phenomenon in question, at least in a sense, but it 
poses challenges to narrative cognition: There is obvious change without intentional 
action. While the way in which our language works suggests that the animals are able 
to change their sex at will, this observable behavior is actually a result of an agency 
that is much more distributed, arising from interactions between genes, organisms and 
environments. The basis of the sex change is genetic, but the switching-on of the re-
spective gene is caused by an environment made up of a plurality of actors none of 
which can meaningfully be assumed to orchestrate the ‘demographic’ change taking 
place in the animal population. 
InGen’s failure thus lies in a category mistake in the understanding of life: In their 
obsession with recreating life by means of genetic engineering, they seem to have 
overlooked that a living organism cannot be controlled at the level of the genome and 
that its emergent (sexual) behavior is more than the sum of its parts. Since reproduc-
tion is a feature of living entities, one cannot wish to “make an animal and not expect 
it to act alive” (JP: 284), as Malcolm puts it. Consequently, Walsh (2011: 75) stresses 
that “genes, organisms, species, ecosystems, and the whole of natural history” are 
actually all “emergent phenomena,” caught up in highly recursive loops that foreclose 
the possibility of discrete agencies. The problem, again, is that “[n]arrative accounts 
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of evolutionary processes attribute agency to one or other of these phenomena and so 
inevitably traduce the way the laws of natural selection operate” (ibid.). InGen’s 
‘agent narrative,’66 which reduces life to the micro-level of genes and DNA, is there-
fore too short-sighted in the way in which it suggests controllability of a complex 
ecosystem. As Sabine Sielke puts it: “By projecting a sense of life as a spontaneous 
force which resists codification Jurassic Park actually undoes the paradoxical notion 
of DNA as both code-script and self-possessed agent.”67 In the final section of this 
essay, I will try to assess the “sense of life” Crichton’s novel projects by deducing 
some general conclusions about ecological understandings of life from my reading of 
the text. 
4_Ecological Understandings of Life as Emergent Phenomenon  
Because of the critique of gene-centric definitions of life that Crichton’s novel issues, 
Jurassic Park ultimately provokes the question of what kind of agent life is. By ap-
proaching this question from an ‘ecological’ vantage point, broadly speaking, I mean 
to reconnect it to my initial interest in “the limits of our narrativizing intelligence” 
(Abbott 2008: 241) when confronted with the cognitive challenge of comprehending 
emergence. Put simply, the difficulty of understanding the agency of life is that we 
are dealing with a phenomenon that paradoxically resists the idea of discrete agents. 
The problem with gene-centric accounts of life is that they reduce its complexity by 
re-introducing genes or DNA as centralized agents, which are then regarded as the 
stuff of ‘life itself.’68 In her sketch of “(posthuman) environmental ethics,”69 Stacy 
Alaimo has problematized the shortcomings of such “genetic fetishism.” Her critique 
concludes that “the presumption that humans can master the genetic code leads us to 
ignore multiple material agencies and the unpredictable transformations that these 
living forces will effect.”70 Moreover, “the overemphasis on genes places ‘the envi-
ronment’ — the entire material fabric of life, in other words — in the distant back-
ground where it plays little, if any, role.”71  
According to my reading of the text, Jurassic Park is continuous with this critique. 
As an emergent phenomenon, life manifests itself on various levels in Crichton’s 
novel. These comprise the level of the gene (most notably in the form of the frog 
DNA), the organism (the reproducing dinosaurs, the human genetic engineers) and 
the ecosystem as a whole (represented, for instance, by Malcolm’s drawings of the 
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fractal curve and the self-similar patterns they gradually reveal). The novel is there-
fore also in line with “the idea of defining life as an emergent property of particular 
kinds of complex systems,” as discussed by Bruce Weber in his entry on “Life” for 
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.72 Assuming that “self-organizational phe-
nomena pervade biology,” Weber specifies that “[s]uch phenomena are seen not only 
in cells and organisms, but in ecosystems,” which calls for “a broader systems per-
spective” in the study of life.73 What Alaimo’s ecological and Weber’s systems ap-
proach to life have in common is that they consider the idea that life is reducible to a 
simple ‘agent narrative’ at the level of the gene as insufficient. 
A further feature Malcolm’s chaos theory shares with ecological understandings of 
life is the suspicion it casts upon the idea that human beings could ever control life. 
Thus, when Malcom argues that “[o]ur planet is four and a half billion years old” 
(JP: 367), that “[t]here has been life on this planet for nearly that long” (JP: 367), and 
that, therefore, “life on earth can take care of itself” (JP: 369), one feels reminded of 
the title of an essay by the late evolutionary biologist Lynn Margulis: “Gaia is a 
Tough Bitch!”74 Accordingly, what Malcom stresses is that the history of life on 
Earth is littered with turning points, and that the only agent that has prevailed through 
all the crises and catastrophes of extinction suffered by individual species is ‘life it-
self.’ This view also entails the thought formulated at the beginning of this essay that 
the agency of life reveals itself in the very moment that human actors believe to have 
mastered it (e. g., by means of genetic engineering). In Malcolm’s words: “[T]he his-
tory of evolution is that life escapes all barriers. Life breaks free. Life expands to new 
territories. Painfully, perhaps even dangerously. But life finds a way” (JP: 159). I 
believe that what follows from this insight is that human beings can still engage in 
genetic engineering for all sorts of different (and good) reasons, but they had better 
abandon those language games that suggest mastery over an elusive agent that con-
stantly redefines the preconditions for its own existence.  
In more general terms, it should finally be emphasized that the understanding of 
‘ecology’ that has been advanced in this essay subscribes to a broad definition of the 
term. In his paper “Pathologies of Epistemology,” which is part of his monumental 
Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Gregory Bateson has clarified what a broad understand-
ing of ecology entails: “Ecology, in the widest sense, turns out to be the study of the 
interaction and survival of ideas and programs (i. e., differences, complexes of differ-
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ences, etc.) in circuits.”75 The important point made in this definition is that ecology 
includes “ideas and programs,” which is why cultural studies must partake in ecologi-
cal questions, such as the problem of ‘emergence/emergency’ probed in this issue. 
The argument put forward in this essay — that emergent emergencies often reveal 
themselves as ethical consequences of cognitive failure — therefore also corroborates 
a statement Bateson makes at the end of his text: “I believe that [the] massive aggre-
gation of threats to man and his ecological systems arises out of errors in our habits of 
thought at deep and partly unconscious levels.”76 In line with this assumption, I have 
argued that “threats” or emergencies in complex systems can result from “epistemo-
logical errors.”77 The particular errors focused upon in this essay are the misunder-
standing of emergence through misplaced ‘narratives of centralized control’ and re-
ductionist conceptualizations of life, as exemplified by the “popular sense of the gene 
as an isolated, controlling, and controllable entity.”78 Bateson’s statement that 
“[t]here is an ecology of bad ideas, just as there is an ecology of weeds,”79 therefore 
points at an inherent connection between epistemological and ethical facets: It re-
minds us that any attempt to conceptualize the world is already a form of ‘acting’ in 
the world.80 Because of the significance this insight attributes to our “cultural ways of 
worldmaking,”81 we may finally conclude that the weeding out of bad ideas to pre-
vent emergencies is also a task for scholars in the study of culture. 
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